An axiomatic approach is applied to the problem of extracting a ranking of the alternatives from a pairwise comparison ratio matrix. The ordering induced by row geometric mean method is proved to be uniquely determined by three independent axioms, anonymity (independence of the labelling of alternatives), responsiveness (a kind of monotonicity property) and aggregation invariance, which requires the preservation of group consensus, that is, the pairwise ranking between two alternatives should remain unchanged if unanimous individual preferences are combined by geometric mean.
Introduction
Preferences of decision makers are often represented by pairwise comparisons when numerical answers to questions like 'How many times alternative is better than alternative ?' are collected into a positive reciprocal matrix (Saaty, 1980) . The basic issue in this field is to derive weights from a given set of comparisons, which can be used for measuring the importance of certain decision options, or for determining a ranking of the alternatives.
Since one can choose among a plethora of weighting methods, an axiomatic approach is worth to consider for this purpose. Introduction and justification of reasonable properties may reveal the advantages and disadvantages of certain procedures, and the axioms may even characterize, uniquely determine the weights.
Probably the first work on this topic, Fichtner (1984) characterized the row geometric mean -sometimes called logarithmic least squares -method (Rabinowitz, 1976; Williams, 1980, 1985; De Graan, 1980) by using four axioms, correctness in the consistent case, comparison order invariance, smoothness and power invariance. Furthermore, the eigenvector method (Saaty, 1980) is uniquely determined by correctness in the consistent case, comparison order invariance, smoothness and rank preservation (Fichtner, 1986) , that is, it can be obtained with changing only one property in the previous result.
From this set of axioms, correctness in the consistent case and comparison order invariance are almost impossible to debate. Nevertheless, there exists a goal-programming method satisfying power invariance and a slightly modified version of smoothness besides these two basic axioms, which possesses the additional property that the presence of a single outlier cannot prevent the identification of the correct priority vector (Bryson, 1995) . Cook and Kress (1988) approached the problem by focusing on distance measures in order to get another goal programming method on an axiomatic basis.
Smoothness and power invariance can be entirely left out from the characterization of the row geometric mean method. Barzilai et al. (1987) substitute them with a consistencylike axiom by introducing two procedures which are required to result in the same preference vector: (1) some pairwise comparison matrices are aggregated to one matrix and the solution is computed for this matrix, (2) the priorities are derived separately for each matrix and combined by the geometric mean. We think it is not a simple condition immediately to adopt. Barzilai (1997) replaced this axiom and comparison order invariance with essentially demanding that each individual weight is a function of the entries in the corresponding row of the pairwise comparison matrix only. Joining to Dijkstra (2013) , we are also somewhat uncomfortable with this premise. Csató (2018c) characterizes row geometric mean by assuming the weight vector to be independent from an arbitrary multiplication of matrix elements along a 3-cycle by a positive scalar.
To conclude, the problem of weight derivation seems to be not finally settled by previous axiomatizations. Therefore we want to provide a characterization of the row geometric mean ranking from the perspective of group decision making.
Focusing on the ranking is a departure from the existing literature, which requires some explanation. First, similarly to the case of inconsistency indices (Csató, 2018a,b) , our setting probably makes the axioms more easy to motivate and the result to understand. Second, weighting methods are often used only to determine a ranking of the alternatives (Saaty and Hu, 1998) . Third, the main result essentially depends on an axiom called aggregation invariance (Csató, 2017a) , that is, the pairwise ranking between two alternatives should remain unchanged if unanimous individual preferences are combined by geometric mean. According to our knowledge, this property does not have an equivalent form for ratings, while similar conditions have been extensively used in social choice theory (Young, 1974; Nitzan and Rubinstein, 1981; Chebotarev and Shamis, 1998; van den Brink and Gilles, 2009; González-Díaz et al., 2014; Csató, 2017b,c) . Furthermore, since the exact meaning of aggregation invariance is determined by the aggregation procedure of pairwise comparison matrices, our axiomatization practically follows from the central work of Aczél and Saaty (1983) on synthesizing ratio judgements.
Other axioms used in the characterization are relatively straightforward: anonymity is probably the most natural independence property, while responsiveness is a standard monotonicity condition directly implied by the representation of decision makers' prefer-ences.
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 defines pairwise comparison matrices, weighting and ranking methods. Section 3 recalls the axioms introduced in Csató (2017a) , and presents three new properties. Some connections among these requirements are revealed in Section 4. Section 5 analyses the rankings induced by the eigenvector and row geometric mean methods with respect to the axioms. Section 6 provides the main result, a characterization of the row geometric mean ranking. Finally, our contributions are summarized in Section 7.
Preliminaries
Let R + and R × + be the set of positive (with all elements greater than zero) vectors of size and matrices of size × , respectively. Let = {1, 2, . . . , } be the set of alternatives. A weighting method assigns a weight vector to every pairwise comparison matrix. Several weighting methods have been suggested in the literature, see Choo and Wedley (2004) for an overview. We discuss only two of them.
Definition 2.4. Eigenvector method (
) (Saaty, 1980) : The eigenvector method is the mapping A → w (A) such that
where max denotes the maximal eigenvalue, also known as principal or Perron eigenvalue, of (positive) matrix A. Definition 2.5. Row geometric mean method ( ) (Rabinowitz, 1976; Williams, 1980, 1985; De Graan, 1980) : The row geometric mean method is the mapping A → w (A) such that the weight vector w (A) is the unique solution of the following optimization problem:
Its name originates from the formula of the solution to (1), which is
Weighting methods are often used to derive a ranking of the alternatives. Ranking ⪰ is a complete (for all , ∈ : ⪰ or ⪯ ) preorder, that is, a reflexive (for all ∈ : ⪰ ) and transitive (for all , , ∈ : ⪰ and ⪰ implies ⪰ ) binary relation on the set of alternatives .
The asymmetric and symmetric parts of a ranking ⪰ will be written as ≻ and ∼, respectively: ≻ if and only if ⪰ and not ⪰ , ∼ if and only if ⪰ and ⪰ .
The set of possible rankings on alternatives is denoted by R .
Definition 2.6. Ranking method: Mapping : × → R is a ranking method.
A ranking method assigns a ranking of the alternatives to every pairwise comparison matrix. We use the convention that ⪰ A is the ranking assigned by ranking method for pairwise comparison matrix A ∈ × . All weighting method induce a ranking method, for instance:
• the eigenvector ranking method is denoted by ⪰ , where ⪰ A if and only if (A) ≥ (A);
• the row geometric mean ranking method is denoted by ⪰ , where ⪰ A if and only if (A) ≥ (A).
Axioms
The six properties discussed here concern ranking methods, that is, they only deal with the relative importance of alternatives. Some earlier works have used similar axioms for rankings. Saaty and Vargas (1984) introduce the properties strong and weak rank preservation. Genest et al. (1993) examine the effect of a coding parameter for ordinal preferences on the ordering of alternatives from . Csató and Rónyai (2016) discuss a condition on the ranking of alternatives derived from an incomplete pairwise comparison matrix. Pérez and Mokotoff (2016) show an example of strong rank reversal in group decision making by . First, let us briefly recall three axioms from Csató (2017a) .
× be a pairwise comparison matrix, : → be a permutation on the set of alternatives, and (A) = [ ( ) ] ∈ × be the pairwise comparison matrix obtained from A by this permutation such that ( ) = ( ) ( ) . Ranking method :
demands the ranking of alternatives to be independent of their labels. This property was used under the name comparison order invariance by Fichtner (1984) for weighting methods.
Definition 3.1. Aggregation of pairwise comparison matrices: Let
∈ × be any pairwise comparison matrices. Their aggregate is the pairwise comparison matrix
Aggregation is equivalent to taking the geometric mean of all corresponding matrix elements. Aczél and Saaty (1983) show geometric mean to be the only reasonable aggregation procedure, the unique quasiarithmetic mean satisfying reciprocity and positive homogeneity. According to reciprocity, the aggregated matrix is a pairwise comparison matrix, too, while positive homogeneity means that multiplying all individual preferences by the same positive scalar leads to an appropriate change in the aggregated preferences.
Axiom 3.2. Aggregation invariance ( ): Let
is an intuitive condition of group decision making: if individuals unanimously agree that alternative is not worse than , this relation should be preserved when their opinions are combined, i.e., it should also be reflected by the collective preferences.
Note that aggregation invariance does not allow for different weights of decision makers. However, if the weights are rational numbers, then is equivalent to this more general requirement.
Pérez and Mokotoff (2016) introduced a weaker property called group-coherence for choice where alternative should have the highest priority in each pairwise comparison matrices.
Definition 3.2. Opposite of a pairwise comparison matrix: Let
× be a pairwise comparison matrix. Its opposite is the pairwise comparison matrix
Taking the opposite is equivalent to reversing all preferences of the decision-maker, and transposing the original pairwise comparison matrix.
Axiom 3.3. Inversion (
): Let A ∈ × be a pairwise comparison matrix. Ranking method :
Inversion implies that a reversal of all preferences changes the ranking accordingly. An equivalent version of for weighting methods has been implicitly investigated in Johnson et al. (1979) , and introduced under the name scale inversion in Barzilai (1997) . An analogous axiom is invariance under inversion of preferences for inconsistency indices (Brunelli, 2017) , which requires the inconsistency of an arbitrary pairwise comparison matrix and its opposite to be the same.
The three properties below are probably first presented here.
Axiom 3.4. Rational scale invariance ( ): Let A, A ( ) ∈ × be two pairwise comparison matrices such that ( ) = for all 1 ≤ , ≤ and ∈ Q + is a positive rational number. Ranking method :
Rational scale invariance is an adaptation of power invariance (Fichtner, 1984) for ranking methods: the ordering of the alternatives does not change if a different scale is used for pairwise comparisons. For example, when only two verbal expressions, 'weakly preferred' and 'strongly preferred' are allowed, the ranking is required to be the same if these preferences are represented by values 2 and 3, or 4 and 9, respectively. This property has been implicitly investigated in Genest et al. (1993) .
demands the invariance only in the case of a positive rational exponent. Naturally, one can define it for all positive real numbers, but this weaker form will be enough for us.
Axiom 3.5. Independence of irrelevant comparisons ( ): Let A, A
′ ∈ × be two pairwise comparison matrices and 1 ≤ , , , ℓ ≤ be four different alternatives such that A and A ′ are identical but
implies that 'remote' comparisons -not involving alternatives and -do not affect the pairwise ranking of and . It has a meaning if ≥ 4. Analogous axioms are extensively used in social choice theory, for example, in Arrow's impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1950) .
Sequential application of independence of irrelevant comparisons may lead to any pairwise comparison matrixĀ ∈ ℛ × , for which¯ℎ = ℎ if { , ℎ} ∩ { , } ̸ = ∅, but all other elements are arbitrary. Axiom 3.6. Responsiveness ( ): Let A, A ′ ∈ × be two pairwise comparison matrices and 1 ≤ , ≤ be two different alternatives such that A and
Responsiveness is a natural monotonicity condition, similar to positive responsiveness (van den Brink and Gilles, 2009) and positive responsiveness to the beating relation (González-Díaz et al., 2014) : if alternative is ranked at least as high as alternative , then it should be ranked strictly higher when their comparison changes in favour of alternative . An analogous axiom monotonicity on single comparisons is used for inconsistency indices by Brunelli and Fedrizzi (2015) , where the authors provide a further discussion of its origin.
To conclude, all of our six axioms have a parallel version in different topics such as social choice theory or measurement of inconsistency.
Relations among the axioms
In this section, some relations among properties presented in Section 3 will be revealed. Example 4.1. Consider the ranking method based on arithmetic means: :
. It is anonymous and invertible, but not aggregation invariant as the following matrices show: Proof. Consider two pairwise comparison matrices A, A ( ) ∈ × and a ranking mathod :
× → ℛ with ⪰ A . It can be assumed without loss of generality that = /ℓ and 0 < ≤ ℓ, , ℓ ∈ Z. Then = /ℓ is the geometric mean of pieces of and ℓ − pieces of 1 for all 1 ≤ , ≤ . In other words,
where the number of A-s is and the number of 1-s is − ℓ in the aggregation. Since ⪰ 1 due to anonymity, ⪰ A ( ) is implied by aggregation invariance, thus is rational scale invariant.
Note that the proof of Lemma 4.2 does not work directly if the exponent is allowed to be irrational. Example 4.3. Consider the ranking method based on the product of favourable comparisons: :
. It is anonymous and rational scale invariant, but not aggregation invariant as the following matrices show: Here 1 ≻ A (1) 2 because 2 > 1 and 1 ≻ A (2) 2 as 9 > 8, but 1 ≺ B 2 since 1 < 2. Proof. Assume to the contrary, and let A, B ∈ × be two pairwise comparison matrices and 1 ≤ , , , ℓ ≤ be four different alternatives such that A and B are identical except for ℓ ̸ = ℓ , furthermore, :
× → R is a ranking method with ⪰ A but ≺ B . An anonymous and aggregation invariant ranking method is invertible according to • { , ℎ} ∩ { , } ̸ = ∅: it can be assumed without loss of generality that = .
• |{ , ℎ} ∩ { , ℓ}| = 2: it can be assumed without loss of generality that = and ℎ = ℓ.
Consequently, C = 1, hence anonymity implies ∼ C . However, ≻ C from aggregation invariance, which is a contradiction.
Remark 4.5. and do not imply .
Remark 4.5 is verified by a counterexample.
Example 4.5. Consider the ranking method based on arithmetic means: :
. It is anonymous and independent of irrelevant comparisons, but not aggregation invariant (see Example 4.1).
Remark 4.6. and do not imply .
Remark 4.6 is verified by a counterexample.
Example 4.6. Consider the ranking method based on the first column: :
It is aggregation invariant and independent of irrelevant comparisons, but not anonymous. 
Analysis of two ranking methods
In the following, we continue the investigation of specific ranking methods, started by Csató (2017a) , with respect to Axioms 3.1-3.6. Proof. See Csató (2017a, Lemma 4.2) for . Violation of has been proved first probably in Johnson et al. (1979) and discussed in Csató (2017a, Lemma 4.3) . It implies violation of because of Lemma 4.1. For rational scale invariance, we use an example of Genest et al. (1993) , adapted from Kendall (1955) :
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Proof. The anonymity of row geometric mean ranking is obvious. Aggregation invariance: Take some pairwise comparison matrices
Inversion, rational scale invariance and independence of irrelevant comparisons: They immediately follow from and according to Lemmata 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, respectively. Responsiveness: Let A, A ′ ∈ × be two pairwise comparison matrices and 1 ≤ , ≤ be two different alternatives such that A and A ′ are identical but ′ > . Assume that ⪰ A , namely,
On the basis of Proposition 5.2, row geometric mean ranking method is placed somewhere in the region on Figure 1 .a, in the region on Figure 1 .b, and in the region on Figure 1 .c.
It is known that and are equivalent if ≤ 3 (Crawford and Williams, 1985) . Hence the counterexample for in Proposition 5.1 is minimal with respect to the number of alternatives. However, it remains to be seen whether the eigenvector ranking method satisfies for = 4 and = 5. Eigenvector ranking method is not analysed with respect to responsiveness here.
A characterization of the row geometric mean ranking method
It has been presented in Section 5 that the ranking induced by row geometric mean is compatible with the six properties introduced in Section 3. Lemmata 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 have also revealed that and are powerful axioms. According to our central result, they, together with , characterize this specific ordering.
Theorem 6.1. The row geometric mean ranking method is the unique ranking method satisfying anonymity, aggregation invariance and responsiveness.
Proof. Row geometric mean ranking method satisfies , and due to Proposition 5.2.
Take an arbitrary pairwise comparison matrix A ∈ × and an anonymous, aggregation invariant and responsive ranking method :
× → R . It can be assumed without loss of generality that 1 ⪰ A 2 because row geometric mean ranking satisfies . It is enough to show that 1 ⪰ A 2 and 1 ≻ A 2 if 1 ≻ A 2. Assume that 1 ∼ A 2, namely,
For ≥ 3, the proof is based on the following idea. As a first step, some transformations will be made in order to get a pairwise comparison matrix where the ranking according to can be deduced from anonymity in the second step, while in the third part it will be proved that the pairwise ranking of alternatives 1 and 2 is not influenced by the previous transformations. Only the anonymity and aggregation invariance of will be used in this process. 
II. It is shown that
Let 1,2 : → be the permutation 1,2 (1) = 2, 1,2 (2) = 1, and 1,2 ( ) = for all 3 ≤ ≤ . Let 1,2 (E) be the pairwise comparison matrix obtained from E by the permutation 1,2 . Note that 1,2 (E) = E − . Ranking method is anonymous and aggregation invariant, so it satisfies inversion according to Lemma 4.1. If 1 ≻ E 3 and 2 ≻ E 3, then implies 2 ≻ 1,2 (E) 3, but results in 2 ≺ E − 3, a contradiction. If 1 ≺ E 3 and 2 ≺ E 3, then implies 2 ≺ 1,2 (E) 3, but results in 2 ≻ E − 3, a contradiction.
Due to the anonymity of the ranking method , it can be supposed without loss of generality that 1
→ be the permutation 2, (1) = 1, 2, (2) = , 2, ( ) = 2, and 2, (ℓ) = ℓ for all ℓ ̸ = , 3 ≤ ℓ ≤ where 3 ≤ ≤ . Let 2, (E) be the pairwise comparison matrix obtained from E by the permutation 2, .
It can be checked that
. Anonymity implies 1 ≻ 2, (E) 2 for all 3 ≤ ≤ , therefore aggregation invariance leads to 1 ≻ 2,3 (E)⊕ 2,4 (E)⊕···⊕ 2, (E) 2, and rational scale invariance (an immediate consequence of and according to Lemma 4.2) results in 1 ≻ 1,2 (E) 2. But and 1 ≻ E 2 also leads to 1 ≺ E − 2, which is a contradiction.
To summarize, we have derived 1 ∼ E 2 ∼ E 3 ∼ E · · · ∼ E .
III. Anonymity implies 1 ∼ D 2 since 12 = 1 and 1 = 2 for all 3 ≤ ≤ , which means 1 ∼ C 2 because 1 ∼ E 2, E = C ⊕ D and is aggregation invariant. 
and it has been proved above that 1 ∼ A ′ 2. So 1 ≻ A 2 due to the responsiveness of .
Example 6.1. As an illustration of the proof of Theorem 6.1, it is worth to consider the pairwise comparison matrices used in the derivations, which are as follows for = 4: 
All three properties used in the proof of Theorem 6.1 are necessary according to the following result.
Proposition 6.1.
, and are logically independent axioms.
Proof. It is shown that there exist ranking methods, which satisfy exactly two properties from this set of three, but differ from the row geometric mean ranking method (and therefore they are guaranteed to violate the third axiom): Figure 2 summarizes our findings from Theorem 6.1 and Proposition 6.1. First, the three axioms meet at a unique point, denoted by the dot, since there is unique ranking method, the one induced by row geometric mean, that satisfies all of them. Second, the intersection of any two properties, denoted by the labels , and , is non-empty. It is clear that , and negative responsiveness (requiring the implication ⪯ A ⇒ ≺ A ′ under the conditions of Axiom 3.6) are also independent and uniquely determine the ordering opposite to the row geometric mean ranking. Naturally, this observation has only a technical sense.
We do not suggest to accept the three axioms immediately. However, and seem to be difficult to debate, whereas follows from a well-known result of synthesizing ratio judgements (Aczél and Saaty, 1983) . Perhaps it is not only a coincidence that row geometric mean has a number of other favourable properties (see, e.g. Barzilai et al. (1987) ; Barzilai (1997) ; Dijkstra (2013) ; Lundy et al. (2017); Csató (2018c) ).
There are some obvious topics for further research. It is worth to consider whether certain axioms (especially aggregation invariance) can be substituted in our main theorem. Responsiveness of the eigenvector ranking method has been not discussed here. Finally, an extension to the incomplete case, when some elements of the pairwise comparison matrix may be missing, deserves a thorough investigation. Row geometric mean method has been defined on this more general domain by Bozóki et al. (2010) on the basis of optimization problem (1), without affecting at least one desirable property of the procedure (Bozóki and Tsyganok, 2017) .
